According to the theory in question, propositions or Thoughts. (Gedanken) exist in the quite special sense of being ‘wirklich’—a. Fregean term of art which I shall. In focusing on Frege’s account of thinking, rather than ‘thoughts [Gedanken]’ or the ‘truth-values [Wahrheitswerthe]’ of thoughts, their approach. PDF | Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to.

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Freege a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here Firstly, is one conglomeration of two things the same as a different conglomeration of two things, and if not, in what sense are they equal? Take care that nothing gets lost.

Gottlob Frege (1848—1925)

Kaal in McGuinness [] pp. Thoughts are, to Frege, imperceptible: Already in the Begriffsschrift important preliminary theorems, for example a generalized form of law of trichotomywere derived within what Gevanke understood to be pure logic.

Frege’s approach to providing a logical analysis of cardinality, the natural numbers, infinity and mathematical induction were groundbreaking, and have had a lasting importance within mathematical logic. It represented the first axiomatization of logic, and was complete in its treatment of both propositional logic and first-order quantified logic.

This presents a serious problem for Frege’s logicist approach. In focusing on Frege’s account of thinking, rather than ‘thoughts [Gedanken]’ or the ‘truth-values [Wahrheitswerthe]’ of thoughts, their approach contrasts with two earlier, and perhaps still more widely familiar, approaches to Frege — what might be called ‘ reference -‘ and ‘ sense -theoretical’ approaches, respectively — and promises to dovetail with a third, increasingly influential ‘ act -theoretical’ approach, which aims to give gedankee to Frege’s account of the mental activity that pertains to logic, such as judging, inferring, and proving.

Barnes and Noble, Olms AngelelliI.

Article Summary: “Der Gedanke” by Gottlob Frege | Analysis

Thus, Frege concludes that statements about numbers are statements about concepts. Frege was also an opponent of formalism, the view that arithmetic can be understood as the study of uninterpreted formal systems.


Because of the unfavorable reception of his earlier works, Frege was forced to arrange to have volume II of the G rundgesetze published at his own expense. This idea was formulated in non-symbolic terms in his The Foundations of Arithmetic A closer look at this passage, however, reveals only the weaker claim that ‘thinking in human beings’ is ‘at first mixed with representations and feelings’ 46 — something compatible with human thinking ‘at first’ and ever after also including logical elements.

Suppose that ” H ” stands for this concept, and ” a ” is a constant for Aristotle, and ” b ” is a constant for the city of Boston. These act-theoretical reframings of Frege have been further complemented by a wealth of recent rich historical-comparative work placing Frege’s treatment of cognitive acts, along with his technical terminology for such acts, within the broader context of leading 19 th -and early 20 th -century post-Kantian accounts of cognitive activity developed within philosophy and philosophical psychology.

His contributions include the development of modern logic in the Begriffsschrift and work in the foundations of mathematics. Indeed, Frege himself set out to demonstrate all of the basic laws of arithmetic within his own system of logic.

According to the Introduction to Gabriel []these are Frege’s lecture crege for lectures given at the University of Jena in the Summer Semester of He defined a concept Begriff as a function that has a truth-value, either of the abstract objects the True or the False, as its value for any object as argument. Philosophy portal Logic portal. This is a brief reply to Cantor, G. What Garavaso and Vassallo never directly address, however, is a possibility so central to motivating Frege’s logicism in the first place — namely, that thinking is capable of much more than merely grasping thoughts.

Frege’s response to this puzzle, given the distinction between sense and reference, should be apparent. While Frege believed that gedanme might prescribe laws about how people should think, logic is not the science of how people do think.

So far we have only considered the distinction as it applies to expressions that name some object including abstract rrege, such as numbers.


Gottlob Frege – Wikipedia

Geach in Geach []Geach and Black [] pp. Bartlett in Bartlett [] Translation by T.

He put this to use in the Grundgesetze to define the natural numbers. Frege’s proposed remedy was subsequently shown to imply that there is but one object in the universe of discourseand hence is worthless indeed, this would make for a contradiction in Frege’s system if he had vrege the idea, fundamental to his discussion, that vedanke True and the False are distinct objects; see, for example, Dummettbut recent work has shown that much of the program of the Grundgesetze might be salvaged in other ways:.

Frege’s “conceptual notation” however can represent such inferences. These distinctions were disputed by Bertrand Russell, especially in his paper ” On Denoting “; the controversy has continued into the gedankee, fueled especially by Saul Kripke ‘s famous lectures ” Naming and Necessity “. His main argument against this view, however, was gedsnke his own work in which he showed that truths about the nature of succession and sequence can be proven purely from the axioms of logic.

How would Husserl answer to this in your opinion? There, he studied chemistry, philosophy and mathematics, and must have solidly impressed Ernst Abbe in mathematics, who later become of Frege’s benefactors. I hope the foregoing has helped to make clear, first, that the heart of Garavaso and Vassallo’s book Chapters identifies an important nest of topics which deserve further historical and conceptual exploration, topics which are of deep interest to those working in the history of analytic philosophy and the history of post-Kantian philosophy of mental acts more broadly.

gedane Frege studied at a gymnasium in Wismar and graduated in Instead, they are said to exist in a timeless “third realm” of sense, existing apart from both the mental and the physical.